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Abstract
We study the problem of privacy-preserving machine learning (PPML) for ensemble methods,
focusing our effort on random forests. In collaborative analysis, PPML attempts to solve the conflict
between the need for data sharing and privacy. This is especially important in privacy sensitive
applications such as learning predictive models for clinical decision support from EHR data from
different clinics, where each clinic has a responsibility for its patients privacy. We propose a new
approach for ensemble methods: each entity learns a model, from its own data, and then when a
client asks the prediction for a new private instance, the answers from all the locally trained models
are used to compute the prediction in such a way that no extra information is revealed. We implement
this approach for random forests and we demonstrate its high efficiency and potential accuracy benefit
via experiments on real-world datasets, including actual EHR data.
1 Introduction
Nowadays, machine learning (ML) models are deployed for prediction in many privacy sensitive scenarios
(e.g., personalized medicine or genome-based prediction). A classic example is disease diagnosis, where
a model predicts the risk of a disease for a patient by simply looking at his/her health records. Such
models are constructed by applying learning methods from the literature to specific data collected for
this task (the training data,—instances for which the outcome is known—in the preceding example
these are health records of patients monitored for the specific disease). Prior experience in ML model
training suggests that having access to a large and diverse training dataset is a key ingredient in order
to enhance the efficacy of the learned model (e.g., see [16]). A training dataset with these feature can
be created by merging several silos of data collected locally by different entities. Therefore, sharing and
merging data can result in mutual gain to the entities involved in the process and, finally, to the broader
community. For example, hospitals and clinics located in different cities across a country can locally
collect clinical data that is then used to run a collaborative analysis with the potential to improve the
health-care system of the entire country. However, in privacy sensitive scenarios, sharing data is hindered
by significant privacy concerns and legal regulations (e.g., HIPAA laws in the United States and GDPR
for the European Union). In the example described before, sharing clinical data directly competes with
the need for healthcare providers to protect the privacy of each patient and respect current privacy
policies and laws.
Based on the preceding discussion, we often face the following dilemma: share data to improve
accuracy or keep data and information secret to protect privacy? Notice that de-identification cannot
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resolve this standoff: several works demonstrated that sharing de-identified data is not a secure approach
since in many contexts the potential for re-identification is high (e.g., [15, 27]). More sophisticated
anonymization criteria (e.g., k-anonimity, l-diversity, t-closeness, etc.) were proposed by the database
community. While arguably better than de-identification, all such syntactic approaches work only in
presence of assumptions regarding the adversarys background knowledge. Conversely, cryptographic
tools can guarantee perfect privacy of shared data in more general situations. For example, a number
of privacy-preserving training algorithms have been proposed since the seminal paper of Lindell and
Pinkas [24] introduced this concept in 2000. Existing proposals use different cryptographic tools (e.g.,
homomorphic encryption and multi-party computation) in order to allow different parties to run known
learning algorithms on the merge of local datasets without revealing the actual data. This approach
guarantees privacy for all data-providers involved at the price of high communication and computation
overhead. Once the model is learned, we face another privacy problem: using the model to compute a
prediction for inputs while both the model and the input data are sensitive information privately held by
different parties. This problem can be solved using again cryptographic tools, and an algorithm designed
for this task is called privacy-preserving scoring. This is a two-party protocol where a provider with a
proprietary model interacts with a client with a private input in order to score the model on the input
without revealing neither the model nor the input. In conclusion, a solution that uses the current tools
to guarantee privacy at all levels (e.g., for the data providers, model providers, model users) deploys two
privacy-preserving systems, a first one for training and a second one for scoring.
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Figure 1: Overview of the new locally learn then
merge approach in the cloud model. The providers
upload the encrypted models to the server and then
go off-line. The server is on-line to answer to the
prediction requests of the user.
In this work, we notice that for ensemble meth-
ods, for which the learned model is formed by a set
of more basic models and the prediction for a new
instance is computed by blending together the ba-
sic predictions, there can be an easier and more
efficient solution that needs only one system; we
refer to this solution as the locally learn then merge
approach. Each entity with a local data silo (i.e.,
providers) can train its own local model Mi, and
then the prediction given by these models can be
merged at the moment when the scoring for a new
(eventually private) instance is computed. That is,
a user with input x gets y = Φ(M1(x), . . . ,Mt(x))
for a specific merging function Φ. Here Mi(x) in-
dicates the prediction of the local model Mi for
the instance x. In this approach, privacy concerns
coming from data sharing in the training phase are not present since, clearly, local training does not
require data sharing. Moreover, there is no overhead for the training phase (this is run as in the standard
ML scenario), while the final prediction can benefit from merging the local predictions via the function Φ.
On the other hand, accuracy loss (with respect to a model learned from the merged data) and information
leakage can happen during the merging/scoring phase. In particular, a challenge remains with this simple
and elegant approach to collaborative ML: if we want to guarantee model and user’s input privacy (i.e.,
the user learns y and no other information on the models Mi, the providers learn nothing about x), then
even after the training phase each provider must maintain its own on-line server and communicate with
the client and the other providers1 each time a new prediction is requested. Since in a real-world scenario
(i.e., healthcare environment), this requirement can be cumbersome to implement, we design our system
in the cloud model [4], where the computation of the prediction from the local models is outsourced to a
central server and providers are not required to be on-line during the scoring process (Fig.1). Since we
do not require the server to be trusted, each model Mi is sent to the server in encrypted form (i.e., [Mi]).
Once this is done, the providers (e.g., clinics) can go off-line and when a user (e.g., medical research
institution) requires access to the models to compute predictions for new data, the server communicates
1 Notice that using t instances of a given privacy-preserving scoring algorithm (once for each provider interacting with
the user only) reveals Mi(x) to the user. In this work, we want the user to know only the final prediction y and no other
information on the local models.
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with it and computes the answer from the encrypted models.
In this work, we specify and evaluate the locally learn then merge paradigm in the cloud model
for a widely-used ensemble method: random forests. Random forests [7] are among the most accurate
and widely-used ML ensemble models and are employed across a variety of challenging tasks, including
predictive modeling from clinical data (e.g., [22]), that are characterized by high dimension and variable
interactions, or other non-linearities in the target concept. A random forest is a collection of simple
decision trees. By the use of different trees, a random forest can capture variable interactions without
the need for the learner to know or guess all relevant interactions ahead of time in order to represent them
with new variables (interaction terms); by their ensemble nature, random forests effectively reduce the
over-fitting often observed with ordinary decision tree learning. A less-recognized advantage of random
forests is that they can be learned in a distributed manner. In this circumstance, separate random forests
can easily be learned locally by entities with data silos, and then the prediction for a new instance is
computed as the arithmetic mean of the predictions of all the trees in the locally trained random forests
(i.e., the merging function Φ is the arithmetic mean). We design a system implementing this approach for
random forest using standard and fast cryptographic primitives (linearly homomorphic encryption and
oblivious transfer). As a special case our system also addresses the previously-studied task of privacy-
preserving scoring for a single forest. While our scheme is efficient even for forests of many trees, not
surprisingly its run-time and communication complexity grow exponentially with maximum tree depth
in a forest. Therefore we also provide empirical evidence that across a variety of data sets and tasks,
increasing the number of trees can effectively make up for any accuracy or AUC lost by incorporating a
stringent limit on tree depth, such as 8 or even 6.
Our Contribution and Paper Outline. In summary, our contributions are as follows:
• We suggest that for ensemble models, where the output is naturally computed by blending together
basic predictions, our new approach locally learn then merge can represent an effective alternative
to the standard approach for privacy-preserving collaborative ML.
• In Section 3, we instantiate the new approach in the cloud model for random forests. In particular,
we design ad-hoc procedures for the model encryption (off-line) and the decision-tree evaluation
(on-line). A simplified version of our system can be seen as a standard privacy-preserving scoring
algorithm for random forests or decision trees (see Appendix A.1).
• Since the efficiency of our system is influenced mainly by the depth of the decision trees learned, in
Section 4 we present empirical evidence that small depth random forest can achieve high efficiency.
• We empirically evaluate the efficacy of the proposed approach and the efficiency of its implementa-
tion running experiments both on UCI datasets and on real Electronic Health Record (EHR) data
and using different computing resources. Section 5 presents the relative results.
The next section (Section 2) briefly recalls standard notions for decision trees and random forests. It also
describes the notation and the cryptographic tools we use in this work.
2 Background
2.1 Decision Trees and Random Forests
Decision trees are a nonparametric ML model used for both classification and regression problems. While
there are a myriad of algorithms for constructing decision trees, we focus here on describing the model
representation of the scoring procedure. A decision tree, T , can be viewed as mapping a column vector
x = (x[1], . . . ,x[n])> of features to a prediction value y. In practice, we assume that T is represented as a
directed acyclic graph with two types of nodes: splitting nodes which have children, and leaf nodes which
have no children. Moreover, T has a single root node, which is also a splitting node, that has no parents.
For an input x ∈ Rn, we traverse the tree T starting from the root and reach a leaf. Each splitting node
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Ni is defined by a pair (ji, ti) where ji is an index in {1, . . . , n} and ti ∈ R is a threshold value. In the
root-leaf path, at node i we take the right branch if x[ji] ≥ ti. Otherwise, we take the left one. Thus,
each splitting node Ni is associated with the function Ni(x) = e
>
ji
·x− ti and the value ni = sign(Ni(x))
(where · is the standard row-by-column multiplication). Here the vector ei is the column vector in Rn
with all zeros except for a 1 in position i and e>i is its transpose. Moreover, if x ∈ R, then sign(x) = 1
if x ≥ 0 and sign(x) = −1 otherwise. In this way we traverse the tree and we reach a leaf node. The
i-th leaf node is associated with the label `i, which is defined to be the prediction of the query x that
reaches the i-th leaf (i.e., y = T (x) = `i). The format of the labels {`i}i depends on the specific ML
problem (regression, multiclass classification or binary classification). In this work, we assume `i ∈ [0, 1]
representing the probability of x being classified as + in a binary classification problems with labels
{+,−}. We use the following indexing system for a complete binary tree: The root node is the first
splitting node, N1, then we label the remaining splitting nodes level by level and in order from left to
right. For the leaf nodes we use a separate index and we define as the first leaf (associated to `1) the one
on the left. The depth of a tree is the maximum number of splitting nodes visited before reaching a leaf.
In general, decision trees need not be binary or complete. However, all decision trees can be transformed
into a complete binary decision tree by increasing the depth of the tree and introducing dummy splitting
nodes. Without loss of generality, here we only consider binary decision trees. A complete binary tree
of depth d has 2d leaves and 2d − 1 splitting nodes. Random forests, proposed by Leo Breiman [7], are
an ensemble learning algorithm that are based on decision trees. An ensemble learner incorporates the
predictions of multiple models to yield a final consensus prediction. More precisely, a random forest RF
consists of m trees, T1, . . . , Tm, and scoring RF on input x means computing y =
1
m
∑m
i=1 Ti(x). Let d
be the maximum of the depths of the trees in RF , we refer to d and m as the hyperparameters of the
forest.
N1
N2
`1 `2
N3
`3 `4
P2,1(x1, x2) = (x1 − 1)(x2 − 1)
P2,2(x1, x2) = (x1 − 1)(x2 + 1)
P2,3(x1, x3) = (x1 + 1)(x3 − 1)
P2,4(x1, x3) = (x1 + 1)(x3 + 1)
Figure 2: Polynomial representation
of a complete binary tree of depth 2.
Polynomial Representation. We can represent a tree us-
ing polynomials. Let T be a complete binary tree of depth d,
then we associate each leaf with the product of d binomials of
the form (xi − 1) or (xi + 1) using the following rule: in the
root-leaf path, if at the node Ni we take a left turn we choose
(xi − 1), otherwise we choose (xi + 1). We indicate with Pd,i
the polynomial of degree d corresponding to the i-th leaf. No-
tice that Pd,i contains only d variables, out of the 2
d − 1 total
possible variables (one for each splitting node). We call Id,i the
set of indices of the variables that appears in Pd,i and we write
Pd,i((xj)j∈Ii) to indicate this; in Fig. 2, I2,1 = I2,2 = {1, 2}
and I2,3 = I2,4 = {1, 3}. Now T (x) can be computed by
evaluating the polynomials {Pd,i((xj)j∈Ii)}i=1,...,2d on the values
{nj}j=1,...,2d−1. Indeed, if i∗ is the unique value for the index i
for which Pd,i((nj)j∈Ii)) 6= 0, then T (x) = `i∗ .
2.2 Cryptographic Tools
Let (M,+) be a finite group. A linearly-homomorphic encryption (LHE) scheme for messages in M is
defined by three algorithms: The key-generation algorithm Gen takes as input the security parameter κ
and outputs the pair of secret and public key, (sk,pk). The encryption algorithm Enc is a randomized
algorithm that takes in input pk and m from M, and outputs a ciphertext, c ← Encpk(m). The
decryption algorithm Dec is a deterministic function that takes as input sk and c, and recovers the original
plaintext m with probability 1 over Enc’s random choice. The standard security property (semantic
security) states that it is infeasible for any computationally bounded algorithm to gain extra information
about a plaintext when given only its ciphertext c and the public key. Moreover, we have the homomorphic
property: Let C be the set of all possible ciphertexts, then there exists an operation  on C such that
for any a-tuple of ciphertexts c1 ← Encpk(m1), . . . , ca ← Encpk(ma), it holds that Decsk(c1  · · ·  ca) =
m1 + · · · + ma (with probability 1). This implies that, if c = Encpk(m) and a is a positive integer,
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– Parties: Party 1 with input a′ = Encpk(a), party 2 with input sk.
– Output : α for party 1 and β for party 2 such that αβ = sign(a).
1. Party 1 samples r ← [1, R], s← [0, r−1] and α← {−1,+1}; then it computes c′ = Mult(αr, a′)
Encpk(αs) and send it to party 2.
2. Party 2 computes c = Decsk(c
′) and β = sign(c).
Figure 3: The secure comparison protocol ΠSC that computes the multiplicative sharing of the sign of an
encrypted integer.
Decsk(Mult(a, c)) = am, where Mult(a, c) = c · · ·  c (a times). Known instantiations of this primitive
include Paillier’s scheme [28] and the Joye-Libert scheme [19].
In the design of the privacy-preserving system presented later on in this work, we will deploy the
LHE-based secure comparison protocol described in Fig. 3 (protocol ΠSC). This is a modification of
the protocol presented in [21]. Party 1 has the encryption of an integer a, while party 2 knows the
corresponding secret key. Using the homomorphic property of the encryption scheme, party 1 computes
c′ = Encpk(α(ra + s)), where α is sampled uniformly at random from {−1,+1} and r, s are integers
sampled uniformly at random from [1, R]. Now party 2 receives c′ and gets c = α(ra + s). It’s easy
to check that if 0 ≤ s < r, then sign(c) = α sign(a) (i.e., at the end of the protocol the two parties
have multiplicative shares of sign(a)). Moreover, if a is an `-bit integer, then c efficiently hides it when
R = 22`; assuming that Z2k is the message space (e.g. Joye-Libert scheme) and representing negative
integer using the upper half, we can avoid overflow choosing k ≥ 3` (see [21] for more details).
Finally, a 1-out-of-n Oblivious Transfer for c-bit strings,
(
n
1
)
-OT, is a basic two-party cryptographic
primitive where party 1 (the sender) has n bit strings, {x1, . . . , xn} ⊆ {0, 1}c, and party 2 (the receiver)
has an index i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. At the end of the OT protocol, the receiver has xi and nothing else about
the rest of the sender’s messages; the sender learns nothing. For efficient instantiations of this primitive
see for example [26, 2, 11].
3 Proposed System
In this section we describe our system, where the prediction for a new instance is computed using the
random forests trained by different and mutually distrustful parties on their local data silos. We start by
describing the role of the parties involved and the security model.
• Providers: There are t providers, the k-th one, Pk, has a random forest RFk = {T k1 , . . . , T kmk} with
mk decision trees; we assume that the forest hyperparameters (mk and maximum tree depth dk)
are public values, while the description of the trees is the secret input of Pk to the system. The
providers have no output.
• Server : The server has no input and no output; it is not trusted to handle private data neither
proprietary models2. Its function is providing reliable software and hardware to store encrypted
version of the models RFk and handling prediction request from the user in real-time.
• User : Its secret input is an instance x ∈ Rn (n is public) and the output is the prediction for x
according to all the trees T kj ; more precisely, the user’s output from the system is
y =
1
m
t∑
k=1
mk∑
j=1
T kj (x) where m = m1 + · · ·+mk.
2 More in general, the proprietary models and the sensitive inputs can not be seen in the clear by the server.
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We assume that all the parties involved are honest-but-curious (i.e., they always follow the specifica-
tions of the protocol but try to learn extra information about other parties secret input from the messages
received during the execution of the protocol) and non-colluding (e.g., in real world applications, physical
restrictions or economic incentives can be used to assure that the server has no interest in colluding with
another party). Using the cryptographic tools described in Sect. 2.2, we design a system where only the
user gets to know y and it gets no other information about the private models held by the providers.
Moreover, the providers and the server gain no information about the input x. We assume that a LHE
encryption scheme (Gen,Enc,Dec) is fixed and that there is a party (different form the server) that runs
Gen(κ), makes pk public and safely stores sk. The user needs to authenticate itself with this party in
order to get the secret key sk. Notice that the role of this party can be assumed by the user itself or by one
or more of the providers3. Moreover, we assume that F : {0, 1}γ × Z2 →Mn is a public pseudorandom
function (PRF).
The system we present has two phases: an off-line phase, during which each provider uploads an
encrypted form of its forest to the server, and an on-line phase, during which the prediction for a specific
input x is computed by the server and the user. Notice that the off-line phase is independent of the
actual input of the user and needs to be executed only once (i.e., when the providers join the system).
After that, the providers can leave the system and the server will manage each prediction request. In
particular, for each request, a new on-line phase is executed by the server together with the user making
the request. Each phase is described below:
Off-line Phase. The goal of this phase, which is independent of the actual input of the client, is to
transmit all the trees to the server, but in encrypted form. That is, the server will know the public
hyperparameters of each locally learned forest but have no knowledge about the structure of the trees
in the forests (i.e., it does not know the indices ij , the thresholds ti, or the leaf values `i). This is
achieved by having each provider execute the model-encryption procedure described in Fig. 4. Using this,
Pk encrypts the thresholds and the leaf values; moreover it hides the vectors eji by adding the output
of the PRF. At the end, Pk has the encrypted forest ([T
k
j ] for j = 1 . . . ,mk) and the seed sk used for
the PRF. Now, Pk sends to the server the encrypted model and makes public an encryption of the seed,
s′k = Encsk(sk).
On-line Phase. For each prediction request, this phase is executed. A user with input x joins the
system and sends its encrypted input to the server. Recall that the latter knows all encrypted forests
and the user knows sk (the providers are off-line). Now, the user and the server use this information to
run the tree evaluation protocol ΠTE on each encrypted tree [T
k
j ] (details in Section 3.1). Protocol ΠTE
returns an additive sharing of T kj (x), that is the server and the user get r
k
j and s
k
j , respectively and such
that T kj (x) = s
k
j + r
k
j . In the last step of the on-line phase, the server sends the sum r its shares (one for
each tree) and the user computes y as (s+ r)/m, where s is the sum of the user’s shares. See Fig. 5
3.1 Tree Evaluation
In protocol ΠTE (Fig. 7) the server and the user compute an additive sharing of T
k
j (x) from [T
k
j ] and
x′ = Encpk(x). Recall from Sect. 2.1 that, given a tree T and an input x, finding the index i∗ such that
the polynomial Pd,i∗ evaluates 0 on the values {nj}j is equivalent to compute T (x) (i.e., T (x) = `i∗).
Therefore, finding i∗ is sufficient in order to then compute an additive sharing of T (x). In the privacy-
preserving scenario, the main challenges in doing this are: 1) First of all, notice that neither the server or
the user can see i∗ in the clear, indeed knowing the index of the reached leaf can leak information about
the inputs and the tree structure (when more than a request is made). We solve this using a simple tree
randomization trick that hides i∗ for the user (i.e., the user gets to know i∗ for an tree T ′ equivalent to
T but with nodes randomly permuted by the server) and an OT-channel that hides i∗ for the server (i.e.,
3 e.g., the providers can use a standard MPC protocol to generate a valid pair (pk, sk) in such a way that pk is public
and sk is secret-shared among all of them. The user has to require access to the system asking to each provider the
key-share.
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Let (Gen,Enc,Dec) be an LHE scheme with message space M and F : {0, 1}γ × Z2 → Mn be a
PRF. We assume that Pk knows pk, valid public key for the scheme; moreover, Pk, has a random
forest RFk = {T k1 , . . . , T kmk}.
1. Pk samples a seed sk ← {0, 1}γ and completes all the trees in the forest.
2. Then, for each completed binary tree T kj , Pk does the following:
• Assume that the tree has depth d and is represented as described in Section 2.1. That is, each
splitting node Ni is identified by the pair (ji, ti) and the i-th leaf is associated with the value
`i;
• For i = 1, . . . , 2d − 1, compute e′i = eji + F (sk, (j, i)) and t′i = Encpk(−ti); for i = 1, . . . , 2d,
compute `′i = Encpk(`i).
• Define [T kj ] (to which we refer as encrypted tree) as the list of all values
(
e′i, t
′
i, `
′
i, `
′
2d
)
i=1,...,2d−1.
3. The output of the procedure is [T k1 ], . . . , [T
k
mk
] and the seed sk.
Figure 4: The model-encryption procedure used in the off-line phase of our system.
– Parties: The user with input x ∈ Rn and the server with encrypted models {[T kj ]pk}j=1,...,mk ,
k = 1, . . . , t.
– Output : y for the user.
We assume that the user has authenticated itself to get sk and has computed sk = Decsk(s
′
k) for all
k = 1, . . . , t.
1. (Encrypted input submission) The user computes and sends to the server the values x′[i] =
Encpk(x[i]), with i = 1, . . . , n.
2. (Tree by tree evaluation) For k = 1, . . . , t and j = 1, . . . ,mk, the server and the user run the
protocol ΠTE for the encrypted tree [T
k
j ]. Let r
k
j and s
k
j be the output for the server and the
user, respectively.
3. (Prediction) The server computes r =
∑t
k=1
∑mk
j=1 r
k
j and sends it to the user. The latter com-
putes y = 1m (s+ r), with s =
∑t
k=1
∑mk
j=1 s
k
j .
Figure 5: The on-line phase of our system.
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once that the user gets i∗ for T ′, the oblivious transfer protocols allows it to receive `i∗ without revealing
i∗ to the server). 2) Then observe that neither the server or the user can see the {nj}j in the clear, indeed
also these values can leak information about x or T . To solve this we use the homomorphic property of
the underlying LHE to let the server compute encryption of each Nj(x), the secure comparison protocol
ΠSC to share nj = sign(Nj(x)) between the server and the user, and finally an algebraic property of the
polynomials {Pd,i}i to let the user compute i∗ from its local shares of {nj}j .
N1
N2
`1
−1
`2
+1
+1
N3
`3
+1
`4
−1
−1
P γ2,1(x1, x2) = (x1 + 1)(x2 − 1)
P γ2,2(x1, x2) = (x1 + 1)(x2 + 1)
P γ2,3(x1, x3) = (x1 − 1)(x3 + 1)
P γ2,4(x1, x3) = (x1 − 1)(x3 − 1)
Figure 6: Randomized representation
(with γ1 = −1, γ2 = +1, γ3 = −1)
for the tree in Fig. 2. The light-green
node, which is the 3rd splitting node
in the original tree, becomes the 2nd
splitting node.
More in details, in step 1 for each splitting node, the server
computes N ′i , an encryption of Ni(x), using the homomorphic
properties of the underlying scheme and the formula Ni(x) =
e′>i · x − ti − bi. The value bi is computed by the user us-
ing the knowledge of the seed sk. In step 2 (tree randomiza-
tion), the server computes a randomized representation in order
to hide from the user the path corresponding to traversing the
tree T kj on input x. Recall the standard polynomial represen-
tation described in Section 2.1, such representation can be ran-
domized in the following way: For each splitting node Ni, sample
γi ∈ {−1,+1}; if γi = −1 swap the left and the right subtrees
of Ni and proceed to re-index the splitting nodes and the leaves
according to the standard indexing system described in Sect. 2.1.
Let γ = (γ1, . . . , γ2d−1) ∈ {−1,+1}2d−1, now the root-leaf path
for the i-th leaf is represented by the polynomial P γd,i obtained by
taking Pd,i and changing the j-th factor from xij − 1 (or xij + 1)
in xij − γij (or xij + γij ), see Fig. 3.1. Notably, it holds that
T kj (x) = `i∗ where i
∗ is the unique value for the index i such
that P γd,i((nj)j∈Ii)) 6= 0. In step 3, the two parties use the secure
comparison protocol ΠSC of Sect. 2.2 in order to compute multi-
plicative shares of ni from N
′
i . In particular, the server and the know αi and βi, respectively and such
that αiβi = ni. Now, notice the following: let γ˜ = (γ1α1, . . . , γ2d−1α2d−1), then for each i = 1, . . . , 2d we
have
P γ˜d,i((βj)j∈Ii)
∏
j∈Ii
αj = P
γ
d,i((nj)j∈Ii).
For example, (β1−γ1α1)(β2 +γ2α2)α1α2 = (α1β1−γ1α21)(α2β2 +γ2α22) = (n1−γ1)(n2 +γ2). Moreover,
P γd,i((nj)j∈Ii) = 0 if and only if P
γ˜
d,i((βj)j∈Ii) = 0 and the latter values can be computed locally by the
user (after having received γ˜ from the server). Using this, the user computes i∗ such that T kj (x) = `i∗
(step 4). Finally, in step 5 the servers run a
(
2d
1
)
-OT protocol that allows the user to receive the additive
share of `i∗ without revealing any extra info.
3.2 Outline of Security Analysis
Assuming that the OT and the comparison protocol are secure, the security of our system against a
honest-but-curious (non-colluding) server follows from the security of the encryption scheme and PRF
used (i.e., we can use the composition theorem [10],[14, Section 7.3.1]). Indeed all the messages received by
the server are ciphertexts or values that has been additively masked using the PRF. The security against
a honest-but-curious (non-colluding) user follows from the tree randomization trick. Since a randomized
representation is used for the tree, even if the user gets to know the index i∗ of the leaf corresponding to
the prediction, such information does not reveal the root-leaf path in the original tree (i.e., the bit-string
γ˜ received in Step 4 is random). Moreover, the user does not learn any extra information about the
local models since it does not see the individual predictions (i.e., the user only see one share skj for each
prediction and the distribution of skj is independent of the prediction T
k
j (x)).
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– Parties: The server, with encrypted tree [T kj ] and encrypted input x
′, and the user with sk. The
depth of T kj is d.
– Output : rkj for the server, s
k
j = T
k
j (x)− rkj for the user.
1. (Ni(x) computation) For i = 1, . . . , 2
d − 1, the user computes bi = F (sk, (j, i))T · x and
b′i = Encpk(−bi). The values b′i’s are sent to the server, who computes
N ′i =
n⊙
s=1
Mult
(
e′i[s],x
′[s]
) t′i  b′i.
2. (Tree randomization) The server samples γi ← {−1,+1} and proceeds to the tree randomiza-
tion. From now on, the randomized tree is used.
3. (Node evaluation) At this point N ′i = Encpk(Ni(x))), the server and the user run protocol ΠSC
where the server is party 1 with input N ′i and the user is party 2. Server gets αi and user gets
βi (i = 1, . . . , 2
d − 1).
4. (Path computation) Define γ˜i = γiαi, the server sends γ˜ = (γ˜1, . . . , γ˜2d−1) to the user, who
computes zi = P
γ˜
d,i((βj)j∈Ii) for all i = 1, . . . , 2
d. Let i∗ be the index such that zi∗ 6= 0.
5. (Label computation) The server samples rkj ← M and computes ˜`i = `′i  Encpk(−rkj ) for all
i = 1, . . . , 2d. Now server and user run a
(
2d
1
)
-OT where the server is the sender with ˜`1, . . . , ˜`2d
as input and the user is the receiver with input i∗. Let ckj be the ciphertext received by the
user, then the latter computes skj = Decsk(c
k
j ).
Figure 7: The tree-evaluation procedure (protocol ΠTE) used in the on-line phase.
3.3 Complexity
We detail the complexity of our system in terms of cryptographic operations. During the off-line phase,
the providers run the model-encryption procedure to encrypt their models RF1, · · · , RFt. Assume that
RFk has hyperparameters dk and mk, then for Pk the model-encryption procedure costs Θ(mk 2
dk)
operations (i.e., encryptions and calls to a PRF). Moreover, Pk sends to the server mk 2
dk+1 ciphertexts
and nmk 2
dk messages from M. The complexity of the on-line phase is dominated by step 2, where the
protocol ΠTE is executed m times, one for each tree (m = m1 + · · · + mt). Protocol ΠTE for a tree of
depth d and an instance with n features requires Θ(n 2d) operations (Θ(2d) for the user and Θ(n 2d) for
the server) and generates Θ(2d) ciphertexts exchanged among the server and the user (see Table 4 in the
appendix for more details). Therefore, the on-line phase has complexity proportional to nm 2d, where
d = maxk dk. Finally, notice that many steps of our system can be easily run in parallel. For example,
the m needed instances of protocol ΠTE can be executed concurrently.
4 Random Forest Hyperparameters
Since the depth and number of trees (i.e. model hyperparameters) affect the efficiency of our system
(see Sect. 3.3), we provide here an empirical demonstration that bounding them can be done without
adversely the prediction efficacy.
Bounded Depth. Typically, during the training phase a random forest is grown such that each tree
may split in a greedy fashion without concern for the depth of the trees. We provide here an empiri-
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cal inspection of the effect of bounding the depth to a maximum value d on the efficacy (AUC value4)
of the learned forest. We utilize the public Kent Ridge Colon-cancer dataset from the UCI reposi-
tory (reference in Table 2) and we looked at various combinations of d and the number of trees in the
forest, m. Specifically, we consider values of d in {1, 2, . . . , 28, 30} and 25 different choices of m in
{1, 5, 10, 25, 50, 100, 200, 300, . . . , 1900, 2000}. For each pair of values, we performed 30 replicates of a
random forest model construction and evaluation process. For each model, the construction began with
choosing a random 70% of the data to serve as training data and the remaining 30% as testing data. A
model was then built with the specified hyperparamters and AUC was measured on the testing data. In
Fig. 8 we present the results of this investigation as a heatmap. For this task even a maximum depth of 6
was competitive with larger depth choices if 300 trees are considered. This suggests that while the stan-
dard learning algorithm may greedily grow trees very deeply, the overall performance is not substantially
impacted by bounding the maximum depth.
Figure 8: Heatmap of mean AUC values for various combinations
of d and m. The gray line indicates m 2d = 215. The gold star
indicates the best overall combination of d and m (AUC=0.823), the
silver diamond indicates the best overall combination constrained by
m 2d ≤ 215 (AUC=0.809). The silver diamond is also on the colorbar
indicating the corresponding AUC.
Tuning Methodology. Com-
mon practice for training ML al-
gorithms involves some selection
method for determining a choice
for the hyperparameters. One
standard selection method is a
grid-based search wherein a re-
searcher will predefine some set
of choices for each hyperparam-
eter and then the cross prod-
uct of these sets and choose the
combination that maximized the
AUC of the model. For exam-
ple, for random forest, we pick
the hyperparameters as d∗,m∗ =
argmax(d,m)∈D×MAUC(RF (d,m)),
where RF (d,m) is a random for-
est trained with hyperparameters
d and m, AUC(·) is the AUC of a
given random forest on some held
aside validation data and D,M are
fixed sets. However, this proce-
dure searches all combinations of d
and m, whereas we are interested
in controlling the value m 2d be-
cause the overhead of our system
its directly proportional to it in
Sect.3.3. Therefore, between two
hyperparameters choices giving the same efficacy, we are interested to choose the one that produces
smaller overhead. In other words, our approach for tuning is the following: we fix a value s and
then we maximize the model efficacy constrained to choosing the hyperparameters d and m in the set
Qs = {(m, d) ∈ Z+ × Z+ | m 2d ≤ s}. The gray line in Fig. 8 depicts the boundary of Qs when s = 215
and dictates that choices above it are too large, and choices below are of acceptable overhead. Even
if the number of acceptable choices is relatively small compared to the total number of combinations,
it is worth noting that we saw competitive performance as both depth and number of trees exceeded
some minimum choices. This suggests that we may be able to achieve both good performance and small
overhead.
4With labels {+,−}, the AUC (area under the curve) is the probability that a model classifies a randomly chosen +
instance higher than a randomly chosen − one.
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5 Performance
Figure 9: Effect of locally learning then merging compared to learn-
ing from a merged dataset. Subfigures B-F shows on the datasets
of Table 2 how AUC is impacted by the number of providers. The
dashed, solid and dotted lines shows AUC values for the locally learn
then merge, the zero-sharing and the merge then learn approach,
respectively. Subfigure A shows the AUC difference between the lo-
cally learn then merge and merge then learn (positive values indicate
an improvement using our approach).
To conclude our work, we want
to experimentally validate our sys-
tem.
5.1 Efficacy
First, we study the effect of the lo-
cally learn then merge approach on
the prediction accuracy. In par-
ticular, we want to compare the
accuracy of the proposed method
with the one of the standard merge
then learn approach5. We provide
an empirical investigation of this
in two fashions: across three dis-
ease prediction tasks using EHR
data from the Marshfield Clinic
in Marshfield, WI, and across five
predictions tasks from the UCI
database.
Real EHR Data. We consider
the tasks of predicting three dis-
eases 1 month in advance: In-
fluenza (ICD-9 487.1), Acute My-
ocardial Infarction (ICD-9 410.4),
and Lung Cancer (ICD-9 162.9).
Each dataset was comprised of up
to 10,000 randomly selected case-
control matched patients on age
and date of birth (within 30 days),
with cases having 2 or more posi-
tive entries of the target diagno-
sis on their record and the control
having no entries (rule of 2). Data for each case-control pair were truncated following 30-days prior to the
case patient’s first diagnosis entry to control for class-label leakage. Features were comprised of patient
demographics, diagnoses, procedures, laboratory values and vitals. Unsupervised feature selection was
performed on a per-disease basis first with a 1% frequency-based filter to remove very uncommon features
and then followed up with principal component analysis to reduce the overall dimension of the data to
1,000 (this was done to improve the performance speed of our algorithm). For each of the 3 diseases, we
constructed, as a performance baseline, a random forest model with 500 trees, a maximum depth of 8, and
10% of features considered at each split in the tree. Models were trained on 90% of the data and tested on
a held aside 10%. We compared these baseline models (i.e., merge then learn approach) with our locally
learn then merge approach by again constructing a forest with the same hyperparameters except the
training data were partitioned between two simulated providers each with 45% of the original data that
were used to train two smaller forests of 250 trees each and then merged together. Model performance
was measured using the area under the receiver operating characteristic curve (AUC), a common ML
accuracy metric. We present in Table 1 both the dataset information and results of our experimentation.
5If there are no privacy concerns, parties can simply share their data with one another and learn a single model. Otherwise
a privacy-preserving training algorithm can be used to achieve the same result.
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ICD-9 Disease Samples Features Base AUC LLM AUC Prediction Time (s)
487.1 Influenza 10,000 8,211 0.8011 0.7640 105.37±14.70
410.4 Acute MI 9,284 9,136 0.6797 0.6658 121.75±9.43
162.9 Lung Cancer 10,000 9,021 0.6313 0.5786 125.94±8.19
Table 1: Efficacy testing results for 3 EHR datasets. Number of features are calculated before applying
PCA (post-PCA selected the top 1,000 components). Base AUC refers to a forest learned on the whole
dataset (merge then learn approach) and LLM AUC refers to a forest learned in our locally learn then
merge fashion. Prediction Time refers to the mean±std time required for our system to return a prediction
for a single patient query.
We find that the performance of our locally learn then merge AUC values are comparable across all three
prediction tasks.
UCI datasets. We use five UCI datasets (references in Table 2) to investigate the effect of the number
of providers sharing data on the performance of a random forest. To simulate a dataset being shared
amongst t providers, we randomly split each UCI dataset into t equal sized and unique chunks, D1, . . . , Dt,
with each chunk belonging to a single provider. Each chunk was then split into a training (70% of the
data) and testing set (30% of the data), i.e. Di = Traini ∪ Testi. We then learned models in three
different ways. To simulate the effect of zero sharing (i.e., providers with silo data do not share data
or models), provider i learns a forest on Traini and tests on Testi achieving AUCi with the average silo
AUC taken as the mean across all t providers. Each forest was learned with 50 trees of maximum depth
8. To simulate the effect of locally learn then merge, each provider learns a random forest on their own
training data, the forests are merged together, and the AUC is calculated on the merged testing data,
∪iTesti. Again, each provider learned 50 trees of maximum depth 8 and the final merged forest being of
size 50 t trees. To simulate the effect of a merged dataset (merge the learn) we learn a single forest with
50 t trees and maximum depth 8 from ∪iTraini and then evaluate the AUC on ∪iTesti. This process was
repeated 50 times to produce confidence intervals and performed for each of the five datasets in Table 2
across five choices of t ∈ {2, 3, 4, 5, 6}. We present the results of these experiments in Fig. 9. We see
from it that the effect of locally learning the merging has neither a strictly positive or negative effect on
the quality of the model. Indeed, our results indicate that the effect is dataset dependent. Therefore,
we believe that it would be critical for a provider to investigate how the quality of their predictions are
impacted by merging their learned models with another hospital system as compared to using their own
data.
5.2 Efficiency
size n Model-encryption
Time (s) Size (MB)
Australian 609 14 0.84 7.96
Breast cancer 569 30 0.90 9.6
Spambase 4601 57 1.01 12.35
Colon cancer 62 2000 10.57 210.54
Leukemia 72 7129 41.7 733.69
Table 2: References for the UCI datasets (n = number of
features). The last two columns show the overhead of the
off-line phase of our system.
Implementation details. To test effi-
ciency (i.e., bandwidth and running time)
we implemented our proposed system in
Python3.5.2. As underlying LHE we use
Joye-Libert’s scheme [19] withM = Z264 and
100-bit security. We assume all inputs are
real number with absolute value less or equal
to 2·103 and at most 3 digits in the fractional
part. To convert them into values in M, we
multiply each value by 103. This allows to
represent all inputs with 21-bits values (we
represent negative values using the upper half
of Z221) and avoid overflow in the secure com-
parison protocol. The
(
2d
1
)
-OT protocol for
20148-bit strings is implemented [25] using d calls to a standard
(
2
1
)
-OT protocol (i.e., emp-toolkit)
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Figure 10: Performance of protocol ΠTE on (50 × # of Providers) trees of depth 8 for the datasets of
Table 2.
for 100-bit strings and 2d calls to a PRF (i.e., AES128). We provide an empirical investigation of the
efficiency in two fashions: using a commodity machine and using the HTCondor system.
Commodity machine. We report the performance of our system executed on a commodity machine
(60GB memory and 48core CPU, Intel Xeon CPU E5-2680 v3) for the UCI datasets of Table 2 in the
setting described before (i.e. each provider knows a random forest with 50 trees of maximum depth
8). Several tasks in the implementation were parallelized by multi-threading; all the timing values are
averaged on five repetitions of the same experiment. Table 2 (last two columns on the right) reports
the running time of the model-encryption procedure executed by one provider during the off-line phase
(Fig. 4); it also reports the size of the encrypted model obtained via this procedure. The number n of
features influences both results, however even for the high dimensional cases (i.e., thousands of features)
the encrypted model has size less than 1 GB and is produced in less than a minute. The on-line phase
of our system consists of three steps (Fig. 5): In step 1, the user submits its encrypted input to the
server. Clearly, the performance of this step is influenced only by the encryption scheme used and by the
dimension of the input (i.e., number of features n). In our experiments, even for the largest value of n,
this step takes less than a second (e.g., 0.17 seconds for n = 7129). In step 2, the server and the user
execute m times the protocol ΠTE to evaluate each tree in the merge of all the forests. Fig. 10 illustrates
the performance of this part (the most expensive one in the on-line phase): The two graphs on the left
depict the running time of the protocol ΠTE run on 50 t trees as function of the parameter t, number of
providers; the results are dataset dependent since the server executes Θ(n 2d) cryptographic operations.
The graph on the right of Fig. 10 reports the size of the messages exchanged by the server and the user
as function of t. This value is not influenced by n (dataset size) and it only increases linearly with the
number of trees; in our experiment, even for 300 trees the bandwidth required is always less than 60 MB.
In the last step of the on-line phase (step 3), the server and the user sum their shares; the overhead of
this step is independent of n and influenced only by the total number of trees (e.g., in our experiment
this needs less than 8 ms for 300 trees).
HTCondor. The experiments for the real EHR data were executed using the HTCondor system, a
high-throughput computing architecture that we utilized in a master-worker fashion. For each forest,
one tree was learned as a separate job exploiting the heavy parallelization available to random forests.
Thus, both training and prediction were performed in a high-throughput manner. We report the running
time of the on-line phase in this setting in the last column on the right of Table 1. We find that this
parallelized version of our algorithm allows us to provide near real-time interactions as predictions are
returned on average within two minutes of providing a query to the system. We believe that this would
be reasonably fast enough to support the workflow of a physician who wishes to query the model for a
single patient.
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6 Related Works
Privacy-preserving training considers the scenario where different parties have their own private datasets
and want to train a machine learning model on the merge without each part having to reveal extra
information about its local dataset to the others. There is an extensive research that propose privacy-
preserving training systems (see [1] or [23] as surveys and [9] for a recent example) and few of them focus
on training decision tree. In 2000, Lindell and Pinkas [24] presented a system for two parties having
each one a private database (both with same feature types) and willing to collaborate in order to run
the ID3 learning algorithm on the union of them. Their system uses oblivious polynomial evaluation [25]
and Yao’s protocol [37]. Threshold homomorphic encryption is instead used in [36] and [30] in order to
consider the case of more than two parties. While the former works consider horizontally partitioned
data, another line of work assumes data that are vertically partitioned among two or more data holders,
see for example [33]. To the best of our knowledge, de Hoogh et al. [13] presented the most efficient
protocol for privacy-preserving training of decision trees. Their protocol works for n ≥ 3 providers with
honest majority (e.g., no more than n/2 providers collude), is based on Shamir’s secret sharing [31] and is
designed for categorical attributes. Lastly, in 2014 Vaidya et al. [34] proposed a method to learn and score
random trees in a privacy preserving manner. Like our approach, their approach requires encryption-
based collaboration to make predictions. Unlike our approach, their approach also requires interaction
and collaboration at training time. One party proposes a random tree structure, and all parties must
contribute information to the distributions at the leaf nodes. In our approach, learning is completely
independent for each party, and hence training is much faster. An advantage of Vaidya et al. is the ability
to also address vertically partitioned data.
The setting where one party, the provider, holds a decision tree and the user holds an instance was
first considered in 2007 by Ishai and Paskin [17] (privacy-preserving scoring). In the same year, Brickell
et al. [8] designed a protocol for evaluating binary branching programs. Two years later, Barni et al. [5]
improved the previous result and extended to linear branching programs. In 2015, Bost et al. [6] used
Yao’s protocol and levelled homomorphic encryption to design a scoring algorithm for decision trees
assuming that the number of nodes is equal to the number of features; in their work they also considered
Naive Bayes and hyperplane classification. In 2017, Backes et al. [3] improved and extended to random
forests the algorithm presented by [8]. Later on, Wu et al. [35] first and then Tai et al. [32] improved the
former result designing more efficient algorithms. In particular, the scoring algorithm of [32] uses only
linearly-homomorphic encryption and is especially efficient for deep but sparse trees. In 2018, Joye and
Salehi [20] proposed a protocol that reduces the workload for the provider and server, respect to [35, 32].
The bandwidth usage for the user is also improved, while for the server the saving depends on the tree
sparsity. Finally, De Cock et al. [12] use secret-sharing based protocol to design scoring algorithm for
decision trees, SVMs and logistic regression models.
Another line of research focuses on constructing differentially private decision tree classifiers, see for
example the work of Jagannathan et al.[18] and Rana et al.[29] Our approach is orthogonal to differential
privacy since we consider a different threat model.
Conclusions
We propose a new approach for computing privacy-preserving collaborative predictions using random
forests. Instead of a system composed by a training algorithm, which usually has high overhead in the
privacy-preserving setting, followed by a scoring algorithm, we propose a system based on locally learning
and then privacy-preserving merging. To avoid the need for providers to be on-line for each prediction
request, we instantiate the new approach in the cloud model. That is, an untrusted server collects
the locally trained models in encrypted form and takes care of scoring them on a new private instance
held by the user. Our system is secure in the honest-but-curious security model and extending it to the
malicious model, especially for a corrupted server, is an interesting direction for future work. We evaluate
the performance of our system on real-world datasets, the experiments we conducted show that (1) the
efficacy of the new approach is dataset dependent; this opens to future works that aim to characterize
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this dependency in terms of the dataset parameters and distribution, (2) the efficiency is influenced by
the forest hyperparameters, which we showed we can control, and by the number of features n, which is
given by the specific application; avoiding the dependency on n is another interesting direction that may
lead more efficient implementation of this new approach.
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A Appendix
A.1 Privacy-Preserving Scoring of Random Forests
In this section we describe a simplified version of the system of Sect. 3 that can be used as a standard
privacy-preserving scoring algorithm for random forests. In this scenario, we have the following two
parties: The provider P has a random forest RF , and wants to keep it private but it is willing to let
clients use it for prediction. The client C has x and wishes to know RF (x) without revealing x. In order
to achieve this, we present the protocol ΠPPS in Fig. 11. This is similar to the on-line phase of the system
presented in Section 3. In particular, step 2 of ΠPPS is a modification of the tree-evaluation protocol ΠTE
where the party with the model knows it in the clear.
A.1.1 Complexity and Performance.
The complexity of protocol ΠPPS for a forest with m trees of maximum depth d classifying instances with
n features is of Θ(n + m 2d) cryptographic operations. Moreover, the two parties need to communicate
n + 2d+1 ciphertexts between them. We implement protocol ΠPPS using the same setup described in
Section 5.2; we test the implementation on the same commodity machine using decision trees trained
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– Parties: C with x ∈ Rn and P with a forest RF = {T1, . . . , Tm}.
– Output : y = 1m
∑m
j=1 Tj(x) for C.
(Key-generation) Given a LHE scheme (Gen,Enc,Dec), C runs Gen(κ) and gets (sk,pk). The public
key pk is sent to P.
1. (Encrypted input submission) C computes and sends to P the values x′[i] = Encpk(x[i]) for all
i = 1, . . . , n.
2. (Tree evaluation) For each Tj , repeat the following. Let d be the depth of Tj
(a) (Randomization) P completes the tree and samples γi ← {−1,+1}, i = 1, . . . , 2d − 1. It
proceeds to the tree randomization. From now on, the randomized tree is used.
(b) (Ni(x) computation & evaluation) For each splitting node Ni = (ji, ti), P computes
N ′i = x
′[ji]  ti. At this point N ′i = Encpk(Ni(x)). P and the client run protocol ΠSC
where the P is Party 1 with input N ′i and the client is Party 2. P gets αi and the client
gets βi (i = 1, . . . , 2
d − 1).
(c) (Path computation) Define γ˜i = γiαi, P sends γ˜ = (γ˜1, . . . , γ˜2d−1) to the client, and the
latter computes zi = P
γ˜
d,i((βj)j∈Ii) for all i = 1, . . . , 2
d (leaf index). Let i∗ be the leaf
index such that zi∗ 6= 0.
(d) (Label computation) P samples rj ← M and computes ˜`i = `i − rj for all leaf index i.
Now P and C run a
(
2d
1
)
-OT where P is the sender with ˜`1, . . . , ˜`2d as input and C is the
receiver with input i∗. Let sj be the value received by the client.
3. (Prediction) P computes r =
∑m
j=1 rj and sends it to the client. The latter computes y =
1
m (
∑m
j=1 sj + r).
Figure 11: Protocol ΠPPS in the standard privacy-preserving scoring scenario.
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Dataset d n Time (ms) Communication (kB)
Nursery 4 8 29.56 10.74
Heart Disease 3 13 22.77 7.75
Diabetes 8 9 95.25 134.66
Breast cancer 4 30 32.69 16.38
pambase 6 57 63.78 48.25
Housing 13 13 1194.01 4200.9
Table 3: Running time and communication overheard of protocol ΠPPS (m = 1).
Computation Communication
User Server
Step 1 2d − 1 encryptions n(2d − 1) Mult 2d − 1 ciphertexts
2d − 1 calls to PRF (n+ 1)(2d − 1) 
Step 3 2d − 1 decryptions 2d − 1 Mult 2d − 1 ciphertexts
2d − 1 
Step 5
(
2d
1
)
-OT receiver
(
2d
1
)
-OT sender
(
2d
1
)
-OT communication
1 decryption 2d 
Table 4: Complexity overview of ΠTE run on a tree of depth d and an input with n features. We use 
to indicate the sum between an encrypted value and a known one.
on six different UCI datasets. Table 3 reports the results and shows that the protocol ΠPPS has good
performance in general. Even for the housing dataset which generates a tree of depth 13, the protocol
requires less than 1.2 seconds and 4.3 MB. This is comparable with the results presented in [32]. There,
the running time for the same dataset is 2 seconds and the bandwidth is 0.85 MB. For the nursery dataset,
which requires a less deep tree (d = 4), the running time (resp. the bandwidth) we report is roughly 1/5
(resp. 1/10) of the value reported by [32].
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